Does sophistication affect long-term return expectations? : Evidence from financial advisers' exam scores by Kaustia, Markku et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209649
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Markku Kaustia - Antti Lehtoranta - Vesa Puttonen 
 
 
 
Does sophistication affect long-term 
return expectations? Evidence from 
financial advisers’ exam scores 
 
 
 
SAFE Working Paper Series No. 3 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209649
Does sophistication affect long-term return expectations?
Evidence from ﬁnancial advisers’ exam scores
Markku Kaustiaa, Antti Lehtorantaa, Vesa Puttonena
aAalto University, P .O. Box 21220, FI-00076 AALTO, Finland
Abstract
Weuseuniquedatafromﬁnancialadvisers’professionalexamscoresandcombineitwithother
variables to create an index of ﬁnancial sophistication. Using this index to explain long-term
stockreturnexpectations,weﬁndthatmoresophisticatedﬁnancialadviserstendtohavelower
return expectations. A one standard deviation increase in the sophistication index reduces
expected returns by 1.1 percentage points. The effect is stronger for emerging market stocks
(2.3 percentage points). The sophistication effect contributes 60% to the model ﬁt, while
employer ﬁxed effects combined contribute less than 30%. These results help understand the
formation of potentially excessively optimistic expectations.
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Shiller(1984,1990)andVissing-Jørgensen(2003)contendthatidentifyingthedeterminants
of potentially excessively optimistic expectations can increase our understanding of asset
pricing bubbles. In this paper we examine the link between stock market return expectations
and ﬁnancial sophistication. Accounts of speculative episodes suggest that particularly the
less sophisticated investors are susceptible to excessive optimism.1 Consequently, ﬁnancial
sophistication and return expectations could be negatively related. Lack of sophistication has
been shown to be linked to investment mistakes in general (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini,
2009).2 Whether sophistication affects return expectations is ultimately an empirical question.
For example, even if the less sophisticated are more prone to over optimism, they might
rationally anticipate this and rely less on their own views, giving more weight to the long-term
historical mean return.
We use data from ﬁnancial advisors to identify the relation between expectations and
ﬁnancial sophistication. The nature of this subject pool has several implications. It imposes
a requirement of at least some level of ﬁnancial sophistication on the subjects. This makes our
tests more conservative to the extent that the effects would be larger among less sophisticated
investors. Professionals could also suffer from behavioral bias, though likely to a lesser degree
1 For example, a Paine-Webber/Gallup survey at the height of the tech stock bubble in 1999 shows that investors
with less than ﬁve years of experience expected 10-year returns of 22.6%, while those with 20 or more years of
experience expected a more modest 12.9% (Fortune Magazine, November 22, 1999, “Mr. Buffett on the Stock
Market”)
2 See also Feng and Seasholes (2005), Agnew (2006), Dhar and Zhu (2006), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008),
Rantapuska and Knüpfer (2008), Kumar (2009b), Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010), Seru, Shumway, and
Stoffman (2010), Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011), Cronqvist and Siegel (2012) and Grinblatt et al.
(2012).
1than laymen (List, 2003).3 Unlike in surveys of laymen, such as UBS/Gallup investor surveys or
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we are asking the subjects about their expectations
regarding a quantity that is central in their work. The subjects thus have context speciﬁc
experience, helping with the generalizability of any ﬁndings (see Harrison and List, 2004, for
discussion).
We obtain data on the ﬁnancial advisers’ test scores in a professional exam in Finland.
The exams cover basics of ﬁnance, economics, accounting, and law. We link these data to a
survey of advisers’ stock return expectations conducted in 2006.4 The response rate on the
return expectations survey is 68%, alleviating concerns of a nonresponse bias, and also in
stark contrast to most survey studies in ﬁnance with 5% to 10% response rates.5 Of the 742
advisers for whom we have the survey data we are able to match 692 individuals to data on
exam performance.
Wecreateasophisticationindexwithprincipalfactoranalysis6 usingthetestscores,general
educational attainment, an indicator for passing a more advanced second level exam, and
gender. The resulting composite index is positively associated with self-perceived ability to
form rational return forecasts, as well with using information sources in a predicted manner.
3 Financial advisers’ return expectations have anchoring bias, but to a smaller degree than student subjects
(Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen, 2008). Sometimes professionals can be more biased: Haigh and List (2005) ﬁnd
that CBOT traders are more myopically loss averse than a control group of students.
4 Stockmarketdevelopmenthadbeenratherfavorableinyearspriortocollectingthedataonexpectations. Later
we discuss additional data involving expectations measured in 2009–2012, largely a bear market period.
5 For example, the response rate in the CFO surveys of Graham and Harvey (2012) is 5% to 8%.
6 Thereisasubtledifferencebetweenprincipalfactor analysisandprincipalcomponent analysis,whereprincipal
factor analysis is more closely in line with our underlying assumptions. For robustness, we estimate everything
also using principal component analysis, which leads to virtually identical results.
2Of the index components, gender is the least justiﬁed ex ante. However, we include it based
on prior research showing that the male gender is strongly associated with better ﬁnancial
literacyamongthegeneralpopulationaftercontrollingforotherfactors(ChenandVolpe,2002;
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011). It is nevertheless unclear ex
ante whether this gender effect would extend to professional ﬁnancial advisers. We therefore
estimateallourresultsalsowithanalternativeversionofthesophisticationindexthatdoesnot
include gender. This produces results that are qualitatively similar but slightly weaker.
We ﬁnd that more sophisticated advisers do have lower stock return expectations and the
effect is highly statistically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation increase in the sophistication
index corresponds to a 1.1 percentage point reduction in the expected annualized 20-year
return on the European stock market. The effect is larger for emerging market stocks: a
one standard deviation increase corresponds to a 2.3 percentage point decrease in return
expectations. Given recent estimates of the equity premium around 3–4% (Claus and Thomas,
2001; Fama and French, 2002; Donaldson, Kamstra, and Kramer, 2010), these effects seem
rather large economically.
High return expectations do not necessarily constitute a mistake. A single individual could
well expect, for example, long-term annual returns of 15% for fully rational reasons. Several
factorsnevertheless makeus suspectthat abehavioralbias ofover optimismis atleastpartially
behind the effect we document. First, we ﬁnd that less informed agents do not just have more
diffuse expectations, but tend to have systematically higher expectations. Over optimism,
rather than over pessimism, has generally been found to be the more prevalent pattern of
deviating from an unbiased forecast (see, e.g., Weinstein, 1980; Hoch, 1984; Puri and Robinson,
32007). Second, as mentioned, previous studies ﬁnd a robust association between lack of
sophisticationandinvestmentmistakesinotherdomains. Onecouldextrapolatethatalsowith
return expectations, the relatively less sophisticated agents are more biased, rather than less
biased. Third, we ﬁnd a false consensus effect, namely that advisers on average expect other
advisors to have higher expectations. Thus the advisers do not try to outbid the consensus
– in fact, they are undercutting it. This suggests that advisers themselves think that lower
rates are more normatively correct. Fourth, emerging market fundamentals are arguably more
difﬁcult to assess. Prior work argues that behavioral biases are stronger for such assets (Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kumar, 2009a). The sophistication
effect we document is signiﬁcantly larger for emerging market expectations, something one
would expect if it indeed stemmed from a behavioral bias.
We also investigate potential alternative explanations to these results. First, advisor gender,
a factor in our sophistication index, could inﬂuence return expectations via a number of
mechanisms. While plausible in other settings, we show that such mechanisms are unlikely
to explain our results. We nevertheless estimate all results with an alternative version of the
sophistication index that does not include gender and the results remain highly signiﬁcant.
Second, althoughlesslikelyforlonger-termreturns, anegativeeffectofsophisticationcouldbe
speciﬁc to the time period of 2006 having fairly favorable past stock market performance. We
address this issue by turning to additional data collected in 2009–2012, a period immediately
following the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, and covering the European debt crisis. Unlike
the main data sample, we are unable to link these data to high-quality measures of advisor
sophistication, but using other proxies produces results that support the main analysis. Third,
4our results could also arise if less sophisticated advisors feel they must compensate for their
relative lack of skills by attracting clients with higher return promises. This is an intriguing
hypothesis, but our data does not support it. As mentioned, advisers as a group do not appear
to try to beat what they perceive to be the consensus forecast. Further, there is no such
tendency among less sophisticated advisers. In fact, less sophisticated advisers are slightly
further behind their perceived consensus compared to more sophisticated advisers. This
suggests that less sophisticated advisers acquire and process information in a way that makes
them simultaneously expect high returns, and believe that others expect even higher returns.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that sophisticated and more experienced advisers are less likely to leave the
expectedreturnsquestionblankinthesurvey. Thisisinterestinginthatitisconsistentwiththe
idea that advisers who self-select out of the sample likely have the most uninformative views,
perhaps realizing this themselves. However, a Heckman selection model shows that this does
not lead to biased estimates for the effect of sophistication.
The results of this paper also link to literature in the following areas. First, we contribute to
the issue of determinants of return expectations. Using the data from UBS/Gallup surveys of
U.S. individual investors’ one-year return expectations in 1998-2002, Vissing-Jørgensen (2003)
documents that more experienced investors, and those with over $100,000 in ﬁnancial assets
have lower return expectations. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that ﬁnancial sophistication
reduces return expectations. Using data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers as well as
the Health And Retirement Study (HRS), Dominitz and Manski (2004, 2007) ﬁnd that younger
respondents and men have more optimistic expectations, but their studies use data that is not
5readily comparable to ours.7 In addition to focusing on different questions, our paper differs
from these studies in that we have professional subjects, obtain a very high response rate, are
able to measure their ﬁnancial sophistication, and analyze long-term expectations.
Our results also contribute to the issue of heterogeneity in expectations in general. A
sufﬁcient amount of disagreement among investors coupled with short sales constraints
can also generate a price bubble (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen, Hong,
and Stein, 2002). Merton and Bodie (2005) argue that professionals’ expectations are more
homogenous since they tend to use similar data and methods. Earlier studies documenting
diffuse expectations include Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) for laymen, Welch (2000) for ﬁnancial
economists, and Graham and Harvey (2012) for CFOs. With the exception of Vissing-
Jørgensen (2003) discussed earlier, these studies do not analyze the source of the cross-
sectional variation. While we ﬁnd that sophistication is a strong predictor of expectations,
substantial heterogeneity remains even after controlling for employer ﬁxed effects, and even
after limiting to a subsample of advisers who state that employer material is a key source on
which they base their expectations (62% of advisers). This shows that different interpretations
of the same information are a major source of heterogeneity. One implication is that using
professional advice may not substantially reduce the heterogeneity in investors’ expectations.
7 Thisisduetothreereasons. 1)Theirsurveyquestiononreturnexpectationsstartsbytheline“Weareinterested
in how well you think the economy will do in the next year”. This might lead respondents to concentrate on
their expectations regarding the real economy, possibly ignoring the fact that changes in market prices during
a 12-month period primarily reﬂect changes in market expectations. 2) The question talks about “mutual fund
shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average”, which adds another layer of
complication and might lead the respondent one way or the other. 3) Instead of percentage return, they ask for a
probabilitythatfundsharesinoneyearwillbeworthmorethancurrently. Assomeindicationthattherespondents
in those surveys may have quite uninformative views, over 30% of the respondents give 50-50 chances.
6Finally, our paper relates to studies on ﬁnancial advice and advisers, a topic of increasing
recent interest. Expected returns are key inputs in asset allocation models (Damodaran, 2012)
and advisers have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investors’ choices (Campbell, 2006; Bluethgen
et al., 2008; Mullainathan, Nöth, and Schoar, 2009). However, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that retail customers are reluctant to receive free unbiased ﬁnancial advise, and that those
who would most beneﬁt from the advice are least likely to obtain it. Hong, Scheinkman, and
Xiong(2008)studytheassetpricingimplicationsofﬁnancialadviceinamodelofheterogenous
advisor ability.
In the remainder of the paper, section 2 presents the data, section 3 discusses the
measurement of ﬁnancial sophistication, and Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5
discusses additional issues related to sophistication and gender, and section 6 concludes.
2. Data
A. Professional examination test scores
We measure adviser ability using a unique objective measure, test score data from the
Finnish Association of Securities Dealers’ (FASD)8 professional examinations. The FASD
maintains two investment services degrees: General Securities Examination (hereafter ﬁrst
level exam) and Investment Adviser Examination (second level exam). The objective of the
examination system is to promote the ﬁnancial knowledge in the industry, but the law does not
require investment advisers to pass the examination. Passing rate in our sample period was
8 FASD is a co-operation and self-regulatory organization of the Finnish investment services industry. Its
members are brokers, dealers and other licensed ﬁnancial service providers that engage in public securities
trading by business.
7ca. 70%, more recently passing rates have been as low as 60%. This decline in passing rates
probably reﬂects selection; earlier test takers were more sophisticated.
Our test score data includes all individuals who took the ﬁrst level exam between its
inceptionin2000and2010. Theﬁrstlevelexamcoversbasicsofeconomics,ﬁnancialstatement
analysis, ﬁnancial instruments including derivatives, stock valuation, mutual funds, taxation
and other securities regulation. The exam has 50 multiple choice questions (a correct answer
gives 2 points, a wrong answer is penalized by 2 points) and three verbal questions each worth
one point. Hence, the maximum score is 103 points and the minimum is -100 points. The
points required for passing vary from one exam to another, but are usually in the range of 40 to
50 points.
Overall exam difﬁculty may vary slightly from one exam to another, and there is no scaling
in the scores. Hence, the raw scores from one exam are not directly comparable to scores from
another exam. We create a standardized z-score calculated by subtracting the test date mean
score and then dividing by the test date standard deviation of the scores. A value of one in this
metric means that the respondent received a test score one standard deviation above the test
date mean score. We include allexam takers, including those whofail, in computing themeans
and standard deviations.
We link the test scores to a web survey of 742 ﬁnancial advisers described in using adviser’s
names and their employers as link keys. With these link keys, we manage to match 694 out of
the 742 advisers. We use the score from the ﬁrst test taken by each adviser. As the survey only
included advisers that have eventually passed the ﬁrst level exam, those who failed their ﬁrst
attempt will have a score that is below passing level. An alternative is to use the highest score
8attained but we feel that the ﬁrst score is a more pure measure of ability.9 The lowest raw test
score we observe in the remaining sample is 24 points, and the sample z-score has an above
zeromean. Asonlyadviserswhohavepassedtheexamareincluded,oursampleistiltedtoward
the relatively more sophisticated advisers.
B. Web survey of ﬁnancial advisers
The web survey targeted 1,465 ﬁnancial advisers who had passed the ﬁrst level exam.
Data from the survey were previously used by Kaustia, Laukkanen, and Puttonen (2009).
They did not analyze the question we address, nor did they utilize the variables measuring
return expectations. The survey was conducted in May 2006. It gathered 742 responses,
corresponding to a response rate of 68%. The data includes information on adviser
demographics, expected returns, and self-perceived determinants of these expectations.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the sample demographics. Of the 742 respondents, 67%
are females and 33% males.10 An average adviser is 43.6 year old and has 6.3 years of work
experience as a ﬁnancial adviser. 20% had also passed the second level exam during 2001-2006
and 53% of the respondents have a university or a college degree.
In the survey, the respondents were asked to supply a ﬁgure they would give their clients
when asked about the expected annual return for European (EU-15) stocks and emerging
marketsstocksoverthenext20years. Theywerealsoaskedtogivetheirbestguessontheﬁgure
9 We have estimated our results also using the highest score instead of the ﬁrst score, and the results are
effectively unchanged.
10 Three respondents did not report their gender. These three were assigned a gender using the ﬁrst name
frequency database of the Finnish Population Register Centre – available at http://verkkopalvelu.vrk.fi/
nimipalvelu/default.asp?L=3. The gender of two respondents could be determined with a 100% likelihood
and the third with a 99.99% likelihood based on recorded ﬁrst name frequencies by age groups.
9other advisers would tell their clients to expect from European stocks. These expectatation are
described in detail in section 4.
After supplying the expected return ﬁgures the advisers were asked to respond to questions
that may help explain what they base their return expectations on. Figure 1 shows the relative
frequencies of the various data sources that the advisers reported using. The dominant
information source is employer supplied material, comprising of investment strategy reviews
and other internal reports. More than 30% of the respondents also stated that the business
media and interest rates inﬂuence their return expectations.
The respondents were also asked to evaluate whether they perceive themselves as better,
worse, or average in their competence of forecasting future returns compared to their peers.
Overall, 10% of the respondents considered themselves as better, 12% as worse and 79%
as average forecasters. The average conﬁdence level does not suggest overconﬁdence nor
underconﬁdence. Only6%ofwomenandasmuchas17%ofmenconsiderthemselvesasbetter
than average forecasters whereas 15% of women and only 5% of men think of themselves as
worsethanaverageinforecastingfuturestockmarketreturns. Conﬁdenceinforecastingability
is positively correlated with having passed the second level exam. Better (worse) forecasters
also report a higher (lower) than average number of information sources used as a basis for
return expectations.
3. Measuring adviser sophistication
Sophisticated advisers have knowledge about economics, ﬁnancial market institutions,
assets, and regulations, as well as the analytical and cognitive capabilities to use and apply
10that knowledge in ﬁnancial decision making. Our combined dataset has ﬁve measures that are
plausibly correlated with the aspects of ﬁnancial sophistication: ﬁrst level exam test scores,
whether the adviser has passed a second level exam (but no scores are available), the years of
work experience as a ﬁnancial adviser, general educational attainment, and gender.
The professional exams are designed to measure analytical skills in ﬁnancial knowledge.
As with all exams, the actual test scores reﬂect both the true abilities and knowledge of the
exam takers but also contain some degree of noise. Many exam takers participate in prep
courses or self-study to perform well in the exam, without necessarily being more ﬁnancially
sophisticated. Therefore, the test scores will give a noisy signal of ﬁnancial sophistication.
Similarly, passing the second level may be a noisy proxy of sophistication.
Advisers learn about ﬁnancial markets and the institutions involved as they work in the
business. The length of work experience will likely have learning curve effects: ﬁrst year
on the job teaches more than the second year, and so on. We use log of years of work
experience to account for this effect. However, as we only have a cross-sectional sample
of advisers, an additional year of experience may not be related to more sophistication. It
could be that the more sophisticated advisers are promoted to other positions. Thus the more
experienced advisers who we observe in data, may on average be less sophisticated than less
experienced advisers included in our data. Therefore, experience is also a noisy signal of
adviser sophistication.
Generaleducationalattainmentisaproxyforanalyticalandcognitiveskills. Moreeducated
advisersmayalsohavebetterinformationacquisitionandprocessingskills. Wecreateacollege
dummy variable taking the value of one for advisers with a completed university or college
11degree.11 However, not all schools and universities are of equal quality, and perhaps even more
importantly not all academic programs teach equally about ﬁnancial and economic issues.
Thus, advisers’ academic background likely measures ﬁnancial sophistication, but with some
noise.
ChenandVolpe(2002)ﬁndagenderdifferenceinﬁnancialliteracyamongcollegestudents,
while controlling for the students’ majors, class rank, work experience, and age. Lusardi
and Mitchell (2008) document that women have a lower level of ﬁnancial literacy among a
broad cross-section of US near-retirement age and retirement age households (the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS)). Using HRS data, we ﬁnd that men also are signiﬁcantly more often
in charge of the household ﬁnancial matters than women.12 Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie
(2011) document the gender gap in ﬁnancial literacy in Dutch data, and show that it is is even
greater in advanced ﬁnancial literacy. Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh (2011) ﬁnd a similar
large gender difference in Swedish data. These two studies use data from countries that are
close to Finland in terms of institutions and culture.
This population-wide sophistication difference may to some extent also apply to ﬁnancial
advisers. In our adviser sample, men perform better in professional exams, they receive on
average 2.4 points more than women do in the ﬁrst level professional exam. 27% of men have
11 About half of each age cohort in Finland graduate from three-year junior-colleges (Gymnasia) qualifying them
towards M.Sc. degree granting university studies. We assign college dummy = 1 also to these respondents even
if they had not completed a higher academic degree at the time of the survey. The main results are nevertheless
similar if we assign college dummy = 0 to them instead.
12 Within HRS households consisting of a male and female couple, 60% of the households assign the male as the
respondent to ﬁnancial questions, while more than 80% of the housholds assign the female as the respondent
of family related questions. Even in households where women earn over $10,000 more than their spouses and
controlling for age differences, the men are more often the ﬁnancial respondents.
12passed the second level exam compared to 16% of women. Further, the fact that two thirds
of advisers, in an otherwise male-dominated industry, are women is consistent with more
sophisticatedemployeesadvancingtootherpositions. Thus,webelievethattheadvisergender
noisily measures ﬁnancial sophistication.
Astheﬁvevariables(testscore,2ndlevelexam,collegedummy,logexperience,andgender)
likely measure different aspects of sophistication, we wish to extract the common variation in
them to use as a sophistication measure. Table 2 shows the cross-correlations between these
ﬁve variables. Most of the cross-correlations are statistically signiﬁcant. The exception is log
experience, which is not correlated with any of the variables at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
We use factor analysis to extract the common variation in the sophistication proxies.13
Factor analysis yields k factors linearly transformed from the p proxy variables where k < p
such that the resulting factors explain the maximum amount of the observed variance in
the proxy variables. Effectively we condense all the information in the proxy variables in a
way that retains the maximum amount of information. Since the common information in
the sophistication proxies is the easiest to condense, the resulting factor mostly reﬂects the
common variation, which we argue measures sophistication.
When we include all ﬁve sophistication proxies (p = 5) to create a one factor (k = 1)
output, the factor loading of log experience is almost zero. As already noted, the statistically
insigniﬁcant correlation of experience with the other proxies makes it a worse candidate for
factor analysis.14 As previously discussed, there are reasons suggesting that experience may
13 A similar approach is used, e.g., by Baker and Wurgler (2006) in creating their investor sentiment index.
14 Formally, the Keyser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for log experience is below the acceptable
13not measure sophistication in these data. We therefore drop log experience variable and use
theotherfoursophisticationproxies(p =4)tocreateafactortocapturethecommonvariation.
The absolute loadings of the four factors are roughly equal. Gender and college dummies
receive slightly more weight than the two professional exam related attributes. As the cross-
correlation results from Table 2 indicate, gender (female = 1, male = 0) receives a negative
factor loading, while the other three receive a positive factor loading. We believe that the
common variation in these four variables is correlated with the ﬁnancial sophistication of the
adviser and that the resulting factor proxies for unobserved sophistication. We denote it by
sophistication composite index.15
Next we relate the sophistication composite index to advisers’ self perceived ability to form
rational return expectations, as well as the sources of information they use in forming these
expectations. We run logit regressions where the dependent variable indicates particular self
perceived ability (such as above average), or with the analysis of information sources, indicates
using particular source. In addition to the sophistication index, the regressions include control
variables (advisor age and length of work experience, and in the case of information sources,
dummies for below and above average forecasting ability).
Ex ante, we would expect sophistication to be positively related to self-perceived ability, as
well as to using interest rates, economic statistics and ratios, and outside strategy reviews as
information sources. Interest rates and economic statistics are key inputs in forward-looking
threshold of 0.5. Linear and quadratic work experience also inadequately explain common variance.
15 This sophistication index is highly correlated with a naïve index constructed by summing over the set of
standardized proxy variables with equal weights. All of the subsequently reported results are very similar if we
use equal weighting instead.
14forecasts of equity returns. Using outside strategy reviews, on the other hand, could be a
proxy for being generally more informed. The results reported in Table 3 by and large conﬁrm
these predictions. Panel A shows that sophistication and self-perceived ability are signiﬁcantly
positively related. Panel B deals with information sources. The relation is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant (at 5% level) for interest rates and economic statistics. It is also positive
andstatisticallysigniﬁcantforoutsidestrategyreviewsinaunivariatetest, butinthefullmodel
the t-statistic drops to 1.2. While the other information sources (employer material, ﬁnancial
media, discussionswithcolleagues, andhistoricalreturns)couldallpotentiallyreceivepositive
weights when formulating a rational forecast, we do not expect them to be strongly related to
sophistication in our context. In line with these expectations, Panel B of Table 3 shows that
those effects are all insigniﬁcant.
Inadditiontotheanalysisofthecorrelationsbetweenthesophisticationindexcomponents
discussedearlier, theanalysis inTable3providesadditionalconﬁrmingevidenceofthevalidity
of our sophistication index.
4. Results
A. Univariate analysis
Table 4 shows univariate results on advisers’ return expectations. The advisers expect the
European market to return 10.1% per annum over the next 20 years, which is close to the
realized 20-year historical return of 11.6% at the time of the survey. At the time of the survey
the European stock markets (MSCI Europe) had produced a 24.2% per annum return over the
most recent three years, but the markets had just gone down by 2.6% in May. Thus, advisers
15responded to the questionnaire in a market situation with low recent returns but high past
returns over longer horizons. At the time of the survey, 10-year government bonds had a yield
of 4.0%, so the expected long term return of 10.1% implies an equity premium of 6.1%.
Regarding emerging market stocks the advisers expect a return of 15.4% per annum, i.e.,
5.3% more than from European stocks.16 At the time of the survey, emerging markets had
provided a return of 14.4% for 18-year history. However, the past 5-year return had been
21.1% per annum. Consistent with the higher volatility of historical returns, the cross-sectional
standard deviation for the advisers’ emerging market expectations at 9.8% is double the 4.8%
standard deviation for the European stock market expectations. For comparison, the cross-
sectional standard deviation for individual investors’ one-year forecasts reported by Vissing-
Jørgensen (2003) is 10.3%. For expert samples (and longer forecast horizons), Welch (2000)
reports a standard deviation of 2.1% for the 30-year returns by PhD level ﬁnancial economists,
and Graham and Harvey (2012) report a (time average) standard deviation of 2.8% for the 10-
year market risk premium estimates by CFOs of US ﬁrms.
Some advisers did not want to give an expected return ﬁgure, and we excluded some
unrealistically high expectations as outliers. If we truncate the expected returns that exceed
25% per annum, the mean European expectation decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 9.5%,
and the Emerging market expectation decreases by 2.5 percentage points to 12.9%. The
16 What should the emerging market premium be? Damodaran (2012) suggests that volatility ratios should be
roughly equal to risk premium ratios. Using the full 18 years of history available on May 31, 2006 for the MSCI
Emerging Market monthly gross return index, we ﬁnd that the monthly standard deviation is 6.69% for emerging
market stocks and 4.60% for European stocks. Based on the volatility ratio, the implied risk premium for the
emerging market stocks should then be 8.9% (= 6.1%
6.69%
4.60%), or 2.8 percentage points greater than for European
stocks.
16emerging market premium in these truncated data is 12.9% - 9.5% = 3.4%, close to a ﬁgure
obtained using historical volatility ratios (2.8%, see footnote 16).
For a more in depth view of the dispersion, Figure 2 shows kernel density estimators of
the return expectations.17 In addition to the raw returns, the graph shows the residuals from
a linear regression model, and we will return to those results later. The interquartile ranges
are 2% for the European markets and 5% for the emerging markets. The difference in return
estimate a client gets from a 75th percentile adviser compared to a 25th percentile implies a
44% difference in expected ﬁnal wealth in 20-year investments for European markets and a
143% difference for emerging markets.
On average the ﬁnancial advisers believe that their peers have higher expectations than
they do themselves. This false-consensus effect is similar to what Welch (2000) ﬁnds among
academic economists. The gap between the perceived consensus on European stock returns
(12.0%) and the real consensus (10.1%) is highly signiﬁcant (t-test p < 0.001, Wilcoxon p <
0.001).
B. Determinants of return expectations
In this section we discuss the results of our main research question, that is, can ﬁnancial
sophistication explain the heterogeneity in return expectations? Figure 3 plots average
expected returns by sophistication quintiles. Expected returns are monotonically decreasing
by increasing sophistication for both the European and emerging markets. The slope of the
relation is steeper for emerging market expectations.
17 The kernel density bandwidth is chosen to smooth the raw returns to account for fact that most respondents
gave their estimate as a round percentage point ﬁgure.
17We estimate the size of this sophistication effect on expected returns by regressing
the advisers’ return expectations on the sophistication index including demographics, self-
perceived forecasting ability, and employer ﬁxed effects as controls. The results for European
stock market return expectation regressions are shown in Table 5.
Model (1) includes only the sophistication index, controlling for employer ﬁxed-effects.
Sophistication is a strongly signiﬁcant determinant of adviser expectations. Model (2) adds
the natural log of years of experience as ﬁnancial adviser to the model. Missing experience
data reduces the sample size by 10%. The estimated experience effect is not economically
nor statistically signiﬁcant. Model (3) adds the log of the adviser age. The estimated effect
is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. Also, the marginal age effect at the mean of the age
distribution, 43.6 years, is only 0.04 (= 1.6=43.6) percentage points. For robustness, we have
estimated the model allowing for quadratic age effects and the effects are also statistically
insigniﬁcant. Model (4) adds self-perceived forecast ability. Self-identiﬁed worse forecasters
are signiﬁcantly more pessimistic in their expectations. A worse forecaster has 1.7 percentage
points lower long term expectations that average or better forecasters. However, self-
perception of being above average forecaster is not correlated with having higher expectations.
Controlling for all the additional factors, the sophistication effect remains highly statistically
signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation increase in the sophistication index reduces the expected
stock return by 1.1 percentage points.
Table 6 reports corresponding estimates for emerging market stock return expectations.
Compared to European expectations, sophistication has a stronger effect in emerging market
expectations. A one standard deviation increase in the sophistication composite index reduces
18thereturnexpectationby2.3percentagepoints. Thisisconsistentwiththeviewthatbehavioral
biases are stronger for assets that are harder to value (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam,
1998; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kumar, 2009a). The negative effect of work experience is stronger for
emerging market expectations, but not statistically signiﬁcant. Adviser age is now statistically
signiﬁcant: older advisers appear to have higher expectations for emerging market returns. For
an adviser of mean age of 43.6 years, the marginal effect of an additional year of age is 0.14
(= 6.0=43.6) percentage points. An extra year of age for most advisers also involves an extra
year of work experience, and these would cancel each other on average.
In sum, the results of this section provide strong conﬁrming evidence for the hypothesis
that ﬁnancial sophistication and long-term stock market return expectations are negatively
related.
C. Remaining heterogeneity
The main results of this paper point to an important role for ﬁnancial sophistication
in moderating return expectations. Substantial heterogeneity nevertheless remains after
accounting for this effect. The different model speciﬁcations in Table 5 explain 7.6% to 8.3%
of the variation in the European expectations as measured by adjusted R-squared. The gray
columns show the decomposed adjusted R-squared contributions of each explanatoryvariable
using the Shorrocks (1999) Shapley value method. The sophistication index contributes 60%
and employer ﬁxed-effects contribute roughly 25% to the model goodness-of-ﬁt.
The distribution plot in Figure 2 shows, in addition to raw expected returns, kernel
density estimates of the residuals from a linear model explaining expected returns with
sophistication, experience, age, and employer effects. The residuals plotted in the graph
19have been translated to have a mean equal to the raw return mean. While the raw return
expectations have a left-skewed and peaked distribution, the residuals are clearly closer to
normally distributed. However, controlling for the covariates hardly reduces the interquartile
range of the distribution.
The dashed curve in the graph uses a subsample of only those advisers who use employer
supplied information as a primary source for basing their expectations on. This distribution is
practically identical to the one for the unrestricted sample. This shows that advisers employed
by the same bank and using the same primary information source have widely different long-
term expectations. This is consistent with models of Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and
Pearson (1995) where heterogeneity is driven by individuals’ different interpretations of the
same information.
5. Robustness checks and alternative explanations
Table 7 collates estimation results for alternative and additional speciﬁcations for
demonstrating robustness of the shown results.
A. Modeling unobserved heterogeneity
The ﬁrst three models of Table 7 estimate the determinants of pooled European and
emerging market stock return expectations. Model (2) allows for random adviser effects,
while model (3) estimates ﬁxed adviser effects. The adviser ﬁxed effects model results are
robust to any omitted variables that would equally impact the level of European and emerging
market expectations. The emerging market dummy captures the average difference between
the expected return of emerging market stocks and European stocks. The interaction term
20between the emerging market dummy and the sophistication index measures the additional
impact of the sophistication effect on the emerging market expecatations over and above the
sophistication effect on European return expectations. A one standard deviation increase in
the sophistication index reduces emerging market expectations by 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points
more than it reduces european return expectations.
While the adviser ﬁxed effect captures all adviser related effects such as adviser
sophistication, age, and experience, the random effects model allows for estimating these
effects. The estimated effects of emerging market premium and sophistication interaction are
practically equal. A Hausman test of the random effects versus ﬁxed effects model can not
reject the consistency of the random effects model. The estimated sophistication effect at 0.9
percentage points per one standard deviation change is of same magnitude to baseline mode
reported in Table 5. Adviser age appears to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the expected
returns, while the log experience has a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant effect.
B. Non-response to the survey question on expected returns
In the survey, 69% (66%) of the queried advisers reported their return expectations for
the European (emerging) markets. The response rates increase when we restrict our sample
to those advisers for whom we have a full set of control variables available. The European
expectations response rate is now 80% and emerging market response rate is 77%.
Models (4) and (5) explore the determinants of the likelihood of responding to the expected
returns question. Adviser sophistication could be hypothesized to both increase and decrease
response likelihood. On one hand, as giving a point estimate for stock returns is difﬁcult,
it could be that sophisticated advisers decline from giving a number, especially for a more
21unknown asset class such as the emerging markets. On the other hand, less sophisticated
advisers may believe that as they lack the skills and knowledge of their more sophisticated
peers, they shouldnotgive areturnforecastﬁgure totheirclients evenifspeciﬁcallyprompted.
The estimated results indicate that sophistication increases response rate. A one standard
deviation increase in sophistication for an average adviser corresponds to a marginal
probability increase of 5.9 (6.2) percentage points for European (emerging market) response
rate. Experience appears to also increase the likelihood of responding: for an average adviser
an additional year of experience increases the reponse likelihood 1.9 percentage points for
European stock returns (1.5 percentage points for emerging market returns).
Given that the choice of responding to the question is explained by sophistication
and experience, we estimated a Heckman two-step model to check whether the response
selection could bias our estimates of sophistication effects on expected returns. Having the
sophistication composite index and the log experience in the selection equation, theestimated
inverse Mills ratio is statistically insigniﬁcant for both European and emerging market return
expectations. Thus, we believe that selection effects due to sophistication and experience do
not signiﬁcantly bias our earlier results.
C. Gender and selection effects
Our baseline models explaining adviser expected returns include gender as a component
of ﬁnancial sophistication index. But what if gender affects return expectations through other
channels than sophistication? Prior research has shown gender differences in overconﬁdence,
optimism, deception, risk preferences, and career dynamics.
A gender difference in general optimism could cause a difference in stock return
22expectations. However, prior studies show that men tend to be more optimistic. Barber
and Odean (2001) ﬁnd that men are more overconﬁdent than women. Dominitz and Manski
(2004) argue that men are more optimistic in expecting stocks to yield positive returns. Green,
Jegadeesh, and Tang (2009) report that female equity analysts are less optimistic in their
earnings forecasts than male analysts. Gender-related general optimism should therefore lead
to female advisers expecting lower returns which is not what we ﬁnd.
Could female advisers be more prone to exaggerate return expectations to their clients to
boost sales? This seems unlikely as prior studies show that women generally behave more
ethically (Kasipillai and Jabbar, 2006) and are less likely to lie (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008;
Erat and Gneezy, forthcoming) compared to men.
Gender differences in risk tolerance could cause a difference in return expectations under
some conditions. A highly risk averse female adviser with low return expectations would be
unlikely to invest in risky assets herself and hence might make a bad saleswoman. Given
that the job requires selling equity products, female advisers who select into the profession
may come disproportionately from the right tail of the distribution of return expectations.
Another possible mechanism involves the risk averse advisers updating their expected returns
to conform to employer created incentives. Thus, gender difference in risk preferences might
cause a difference in expectations in the adviser sample.
However, Croson and Gneezy (2009) point out that selection into the profession and
updating of preferences in ﬁnance professionals are also likely to reduce the gender difference
in risk preferences. E.g. Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List (2002) ﬁnd that in a sample of mutual
fund investors controlling for investor knowledge on ﬁnancial markets and investments
23substantially explains the gender difference in risk aversion. The selection story is also not
supported by our data in that the majority of the advisers are in fact women.
The ﬁnance profession is traditionally viewed as male dominated. Kumar (2010) ﬁnds that
stockmarketsreactmorestronglytoestimatesandrecommendationsmadebyfemaleanalysts.
He argues that this is due to markets recognizing discrimination against hiring women. If
the profession favors an optimistic outlook in promotion, but imposes a glass ceiling for
women, optimistic males will be promoted out of the adviser sample. Then the adviser sample
would include both pessimistic men and women, but only optimistic women. In this case the
sophistication index constructed using gender would proxy for career dynamics related effects
in expectations. However, we ﬁnd no support for this career dynamics story in the data. As
more senior advisers are more likely to be promoted before junior advisers, this career effect
should be stronger for a subsample of more experienced advisers. But this is not what the data
shows: The gender gap in return expectations is conversely wider for inexperienced advisers.
Forrobustness,weneverthelessestimatealltheexpectedreturnresultswithaversionofthe
sophistication index that does not include the gender variable. The results shown in Table 8 are
qualitatively similar to the baseline results in that sophistication signiﬁcantly reduces return
expectations. However, quantitatively the effect is somewhat weaker, particularly for European
market expectations. The full model coefﬁcient is reduced by 34% (26%) for European
(emerging market) expectations compared to the baseline estimates. In these speciﬁcations
a separate statistically signiﬁcant gender dummy picks up all of the gender effect.
We partition the sample into sophistication terciles and run the regressions from Table 8
in these subsamples. Figure 4 shows the gender effect estimates for these regressions. The
24coefﬁcient of the gender dummy decreases monotonically when moving from the lowest to
the highest sophistication tercile, and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant in the highest tercile
(nor in the middle tercile with emerging markets). This is consistent with the idea that gender
is associated with ﬁnancial sophistication among relatively less sophisticated individuals, in
line with studies that ﬁnd a gender effect in the general population (Chen and Volpe, 2002;
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011). If the gender effect is due
to a cultural bias, it makes sense that the effect would diminish when sophistication increases,
which is what we ﬁnd.
D. The role of market conditions
The relation between return expectations and sophistication could plausibly be expected
to be positive under some market conditions. For example, if the opinion of less sophisticated
investors ﬂuctuates more with the market sentiment, in a low sentiment period the less
sophisticated investors could grow excessively pessimistic, perhaps due to extrapolating from
recentlowreturns. Themoresophisticatedwouldthenhavehigherreturnexpectationsinsuch
periods. Sophistication and expectations could be positively related also when savvy investors
perceive that a bubble is about to inﬂate due to noise traders’ future demand, as in models
of rational speculation such as DeLong et al. (1990). We wish to note, however, that short-
term expectations should be more susceptible to such effects compared to the 20-year return
expectations used in our analysis.
To address this issue we obtain another data set of advisor return expectations from early
2009to2012. Theglobalﬁnancialcrisisprecedingtheseyears,andtosomeextenttheEuropean
debt crisis beginning in 2010, make this period very different from the period leading to spring
252006 when the earlier data on expectations was collected. These data are collected in 14
separate ﬁnancial adviser seminars occurring on different dates from a total of 254 individuals.
Each seminar has 15 to 20 participants, and the response rate is virtually 100%. Similar to
the main data, all subjects have passed the ﬁrst level exam. A drawback of these data is
that we must rely on more noisy measures of sophistication. We designate those advisers
as experts who 1) have a job title containing the word private banker, manager, or analyst,
2) have two or more years of work experience, and 3) do not make a logical mistake in a simple
probability assessment task.18 This produces 58 experts, representing 23% of the sample.
Another difference is that the return expectations questions are not exactly comparable to
those in our main data. The new surveys do not include a question on European stock returns
nor ask for 20-year returns, but they do ask for 10-year expected returns for emerging markets.
Table 7 model (6) shows the results from a regression explaining return expectations
with a sophistication factor comprising of the common variation in the expert dummy
discussed above and adviser gender dummy, as well as ﬁxed time effects for each seminar.
The sophistication effect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. A one standard
deviation increase in this alternative sample sophistication measure decreases expected 10-
year emerging market returns by 0.9 percentage points.
Alternatively the expert and adviser gender effects can be separately estimated. The
coefﬁcient estimate for the expert dummy indicates that experts’ return expectations are 1.1
18 The survey contains other questions related to stock market expectations. One of them asks for the respondent
toestimatetheprobabilitythatthemarketgoesupbymorethan20%inthenextsixmonths,andthenextquestion
asks for the probability that the market goes down by more than 20% in the next six months. Some subjects give
probabilities that sum up to 100%, effectively implying a zero probability of the market staying within +/- 20% of
current level. We classify this as a mistake.
26percentage points lower compared to nonexperts. The t-value of the coefﬁcient is -1.7, making
it just signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The separate gender dummy again indicates that women
have higher return expectations.
All in all, the results from these data provide added conﬁrmation to the idea that the ﬁrst
order effect of sophistication is to reduce the incidence of excessively high long-term return
expectations, irrespective of market conditions.
E. Adviser incentives
Advisers responding to the web survey asking for return expectations were entered into a
lottery in which ﬁve individuals were randomly drawn to win a book written by one of the
authors. In addition, an executive summary of the survey results was emailed to them. While
this might have motivated some people to participate in the survey, no extrinsic incentives
were provided to promote accurate and truthful answers. This would have been impossible
in practice, as the survey was asking for 20-year return expectations. We do not believe that
lack of such explicit incentives would have a signiﬁcant impact on our results. Prior literature
ﬁnds that the presence of ﬁnancial incentives improves performance in tasks where one needs
to pay close attention (such as memory- and recall-related tasks) and in dull tasks where
intrinsic motivation may be low (such as coding words). In other types of tasks, the presence
or absence of direct monetary incentives in surveys and experiments rarely make a difference
(for reviews, see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011). We are asking
for ﬁgures that are central in the respondents everyday work, and the respondents likely have
highintrinsicmotivationregardingsuchissues.19 Theveryhighresponserate(68%)weachieve
19 Direct experience by two of the authors actively working in educating similar audiences supports these claims.
27ensures that the sample is not only picking up respondents having unusually high motivation
to answer.
Advisor incentives could also interact with sophistication and return expectations. In the
model of Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2008) more sophisticated advisers (the tech-savvies)
strategically signal their quality by overinﬂating their recommendations to differentiate
themselves from less knowledgable advisers (the old fogies). Smart investors can debias such
advice, but naïve investors are unable to do so and so a bubble may form. We do not see such
an effect in our data, as we ﬁnd, contrary to Hong et al., that more sophisticated advisers have
lower return expectations. Their model is particularly motivated by technological innovations,
and one can think of emerging markets as representing such new growth oriented investment
opportunities. However, our results there are similar and even stronger: more sophisticated
advisers have lower return expectations. The practical setting primarily motivating Hong et al.
is the matching process between analysts and institutional investors. Our setting of personal
ﬁnancial advisers and retail clients likely involves a very different matching mechanism, and
thus we do not see our results as directly refuting Hong et al.
Another possibility is that less sophisticated advisers quote higher return expectations to
their clients in order to remain competitive with their more sophisticated counterparts. This
is an intriguing hypothesis, and the data allows addressing it by way of comparing advisers’
expectations to what they perceive their peers to expect. Speciﬁcally, this skill-compensation
hypothesis predicts that less sophisticated advisers would have higher expectations relative to
their perceived consensus. This is not what we ﬁnd, however. Advisers who are below median
in sophistication, on averageexpect returnsof 2.2 percentagepoints lowerthan theirperceived
28consensus. The corresponding number for above-median advisers is 1.6. An OLS regression
controlling for other factors conﬁrms these ﬁndings. If anything, sophistication increases
expected returns relative to the perceived consensus, though the effect is not signiﬁcant (t-
value 1.4). These results do not support the skill-compensation hypothesis.
6. Conclusions
This paper combines data from ﬁnancial advisers’ professional exam scores with other
variables from a survey to create an index of ﬁnancial sophistication. We ﬁnd that a one
standard deviation increase in the sophistication index reduces expected annualized 20-year
European (emerging market) stock returns by 1.1 (2.3) percentage points. The sophistication
effect contributes more than 60% to the model ﬁt, while the employer ﬁxed effects contribute
20% to 25%. These results are consistent with naïve investors having excessively optimistic
expectations,whichisthoughttobeapotentialingredientinassetpricebubbles. Furthermore,
our results are stronger for emerging market expectations, consistent with hard to value assets
being more affected by behavioral biases. Given the nature of our sophistication measures,
there is good reason to believe that the relation we document at least partially reﬂects a causal
effect. Butthereareotherinterestingpossibilitiesaswell. Forexample,alatentpersonalitytrait
could make people more likely to acquire ﬁnancial sophistication and simultaneously create a
tendency to form more moderate expectations. We leave the analysis of such mechanisms for
future work.
Our composite measure of ﬁnancial sophistication included gender as one component,
based on robust evidence in earlier research showing that women have lower levels of ﬁnancial
29literacy in the general population. Self-selection into the profession and potential career
dynamic effects, combined with a gender difference in risk aversion, could be potential
confounding factors. The available data does not support such effects, but as a robustness
check we construct a sophistication index without the gender variable. The main results
remain qualitatively similar in that sophistication is signiﬁcantly associated with lower return
expectations, but the point estimates imply a slightly smaller effect. Part of the explanatory
power in the baseline model is then picked up by a statistically signiﬁcant gender effect.
While ﬁnancial sophistication appears to be an important factor explaining the
heterogeneity in return expectations, substantial unexplained dispersion nevertheless
remains. Employer ﬁxed effects do not markedly reduce this dispersion, nor do controls for
type of information used. The full regression model explains 8% (12%) of the variance in the
European (emerging market) return expectations. This shows that different interpretations of
the same information are a major source of heterogeneity in expectations.
Improving household ﬁnancial decision making by supplying unbiased ﬁnancial
informationandsoundadviseisnotaneasytask. Bhattacharyaetal.(2012)ﬁndthathousehold
clients are reluctant to receive unbiased and costless ﬁnancial advise, and that those who do
opt to receive the advise, tend not to act on it. In addition to this ’downstream’ problem in the
supply chain of information, we pinpoint an ’upstream’ problem: advisers add a heterogenous
component to their employer supplied ﬁnancial information. Thus, households receive
heterogenous ﬁnancial information that is partially explained by adviser speciﬁc systematic
biases.
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35Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The background variables of the ﬁnancial advisers surveyed. All advisers have passed a ﬁrst
level professional exam. Test score refers to the score from the ﬁrst level exam. † denotes
dummy variables. The three education dummies denote the highest level of educational
attainment, i.e. the high school diploma dummy for a university graduate equals zero. The
sophistication composite index is a proxy of unobservable sophistication derived from factor
analysis of the test score, passed 2nd level exam, and the education dummies. Panel A shows
the descriptive statistics for the full sample, Panel B for subsample of Men, and Panel C for
subsample of Women. A total of 742 ﬁnancial advisers were surveyed.
Panel A - All
Mean St.Dev. Median Min Max N
Female† 0.67 0.47 1 0 1 742
Age (in years) 43.6 9.1 44 23 64 740
Experience (in years) 6.3 5.6 5 0 33 591
Test score 55.7 11.4 56 16 99 694
Passed 2nd level exam† 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 742
University degree† 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 730
College degree† 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 730
High school diploma† 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 730
Panel B - Men
Mean St.Dev. Median Min Max N
Age (in years) 39.0 9.6 38 23 64 240
Experience (in years) 6.1 6.0 5 0 30 187
Test score 58.2 11.7 59 16 99 224
Passed 2nd level exam† 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 242
University degree† 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 236
College degree† 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 236
High school diploma† 0.14 0.34 0 0 1 236
Panel C - Women
Mean St.Dev. Median Min Max N
Age (in years) 45.8 8.0 47 24 60 500
Experience (in years) 6.4 5.4 5 0 33 404
Test score 54.5 11.1 55 20 91 470
Passed 2nd level exam† 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 500
University degree† 0.16 0.36 0 0 1 494
College degree† 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 494
High school diploma† 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 494
36Table 2: Sophistication proxy cross-correlations
The Spearman rank correlations between the ﬁve potential sophistication proxy variables.
† denotes dummy variables. The correlation coefﬁcients shown in bold face are different from
zero at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The p-value is shown in the parenthesis.
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Passed 2nd level exam †
0.09
(0.048)
log[Experience (years) + 1]
0.08 0.08
(0.075) (0.067)
College †
0.14 0.15 -0.09
(0.002) (<0.001) (0.062)
Gender, female †
-0.10 -0.17 0.07 -0.24
(0.021) (<0.001) (0.152) (<0.001)
37Table 3: Sophistication, forecast ability, and information sources
The effect of sophisication index on self-perceived forecast ability and information sources
used as a basis for forming stock return expectations. Frequency denotes the fraction of
respondents in the logit model having the speciﬁc forecast dummy variable equal to one.
Univariatecolumnsshowtheestimatedsophisticationeffectcoefﬁcientsandrobustz-statistics
for a model that includes only sophistication as an explanatory variable. Full model columns
showthecoefﬁcientsandz-statisticsformodelswhichalsoincludelogexperience,logage,and
employer ﬁxed effects as control variables. Panel A shows the sophistication effect estimates
for two logit models explaining being a not worse forecaster and being a better forecaster, and
also for an ordered logit model explaining the probability of being a forecaster of the three
possible types: worse, average, or better than average. Panel B shows the estimated marginal
sophistication effects of logit models explaining the likelihood of using various sources of
information as a basis for stock return expectations. In panel B, the full model controls also
include forecast ability. *** and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels.
Panel A: Sophistication and forecast ability
Frequency
(in %)
univariate full model
coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat
Not worse forecaster 91.5 0.40*** 3.3 0.42** 2.1
Better forecaster 8.9 0.44*** 2.9 0.23 1.2
Ordered logit – 0.41*** 4.2 0.30** 2.2
Control variables included No Yes
Panel B: Sophistication and information sources
Frequency
(in %)
univariate full model
coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat
employer material, strategy reviews etc. 70.7 0.08 1.0 0.02 0.2
ﬁnancial media 44.6 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.3
interest rates 38.2 0.21** 2.6 0.25** 2.4
discussions with collegues 28.6 -0.01 -0.1 -0.04 -0.4
economic statistics and ratios 26.3 0.22** 2.2 0.23** 2.0
outside strategy reviews 23.7 0.25** 2.4 0.15 1.2
historical returns 19.4 0.12 1.2 0.08 0.7
other 3.4 -0.18 -0.7 -0.18 -0.6
Control variables included No Yes
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39Table 5: The determinants of advisers’ stock return expectations
Investment advisers’ 20-year European stock return expectations regressed on sophistication
composite index, log experience, log age, and self-perceived stock returns forecast ability. The
sophisticationindexisaproxyforunobservedsophisticationderivedfromfactoranalysisusing
test score, second level examination dummy, gender, and college dummy. Better (Worse)
than average dummy variables equal 1 if the subject self-reports being better (worse) than
the average adviser in forecasting future returns. The t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The italicized ﬁgures in the gray columns
depictpercentagesofadjustedR2 decompositionscalculatedusingtheShapleydecomposition
method of Shorrocks (1999). ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 10.2*** 10.2*** 4.7 4.7
(25.07) (15.19) (1.16) (1.14)
Sophistication composite index -1.2*** 76.9 -1.2*** 75.4 -1.1*** 62.5 -1.1*** 61.4
(-5.26) (-5.15) (-4.24) (-4.36)
log[experience (years) + 1] -0.1 0.6 -0.3 3.4 -0.5 3.1
(-0.36) (-0.74) (-1.09)
log[age (years)] 1.6 9.5 1.7 9.2
(1.36) (1.41)
Better than average forecaster 0.2 -2.2
(0.44)
Worse than average forecaster -1.7** 4.0
(-2.48)
Employer ﬁxed-effects Yes 23.1 Yes 24.0 Yes 24.6 Yes 24.5
Adjusted R2 0.076 100 0.078 100 0.079 100 0.083 100
N 481 435 434 434
40Table 6: The determinants of advisers’ emerging market stock return expectations
Investment advisers’ 20-year emerging market stock return expectations regressed on
sophistication composite index, log experience, log age, and self-perceived stock returns
forecast ability. The sophistication index is a proxy for unobserved sophistication derived from
factor analysis using test score, second level examination dummy, college dummy, and gender
dummy. Better (Worse) than average dummy variables equal 1 if the subject self-reports being
better (worse) than the average adviser in forecasting future returns. The t-statistics based on
heteroskedasticityrobuststandarderrorsareshowninparenthesis. Theitalicizedﬁguresinthe
gray columns depict percentages of adjusted R2 decompositions calculated using the Shapley
decomposition method of Shorrocks (1999). ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 15.3*** 16.2*** -4.9 -5.2
(13.68) (10.69) (-0.58) (-0.60)
Sophistication composite index -2.9*** 78.5 -2.8*** 81.1 -2.3*** 58.3 -2.3*** 59.7
(-6.99) (-6.77) (-5.28) (-5.29)
log[experience (years) + 1] -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 3.1 -1.3* 2.7
(-0.76) (-1.44) (-1.67)
log[age (years)] 6.0** 19.0 6.1** 19.4
(2.44) (2.47)
Better than average forecaster 0.5 -1.2
(0.50)
Worse than average forecaster -0.8 -0.8
(-0.37)
Employer ﬁxed-effects Yes 21.5 Yes 19.8 Yes 19.6 Yes 20.2
Adjusted R2 0.112 100 0.110 100 0.122 100 0.119 100
N 456 416 415 415
41Table 7: Additional results and robustness checks
This table collates results from additional analysis. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the results of
regression models regressing the expected 20-year returns pooling the European and emerging
market return expectations together (1), controlling for random (2), and controlling for ﬁxed
individual effects (3). Columns (4) and (5) show the estimates from a probit model explaining
the response to the return expectation question separately for European and emerging market
expectations. Column (6) shows the determinants of expected 10-year emerging market
returns from a series of later surveys of ﬁnancial advisers between years 2009 and 2012.
Sophistication composite index is a proxy for unobserved sophistication derived from factor
analysis using test score, second level examination dummy, college dummy, and gender
dummy as inputs. The sophistication index (new) is a proxy for sophistication derived from
the gender and logic test variables included in the 2009-2012 expectations surveys. Emerging
mkt dummy equals 1 for emerging market expetecte returns, 0 for european returns. The t-
statisticsbasedonclusteredstandarderrors(z-statisticsbasedonrobuststandarderrorsforthe
probit models) are shown in parenthesis. The R2 statistic for models (1) and (6) is the ordinary
OLS measure, and for models (2) and (3) the overall R2 measure. Models (4) and (5) report
McFadden (1974) pseudo-R2s. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
Expected 20-year return
(Pooled Euro-emerging mkt)
Marginal probability of
response in percentages
Exp. return,
2009–12
surveys European Emerging
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -2.6 -2.5 10.2 0.8 1.0 12.0
(-0.46) (-0.46) (56.04) (0.68) (0.90) (18.52)
Sophistication composite index -0.9*** -0.9*** 0.2*** 0.2***
(-3.18) (-3.18) (3.19) (3.12)
Sophistication index (new) -0.9***
(-2.74)
Emerging mkt dummy 5.3*** 5.4*** 5.5***
(13.04) (13.58) (13.99)
Sophistication index
 Emerging mkt dummy
-1.6*** -1.7*** -1.8***
(-4.53) (-4.77) (-4.98)
log[experience (years) + 1] -0.7 -0.7 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.2
(-1.37) (-1.27) (2.92) (3.19) (0.60)
log[age (years)] 3.7** 3.7** -0.1 -0.2
(2.30) (2.29) (-0.36) (-0.71)
Employer ﬁxed-effects Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes No
Time dummies — — — — — Yes
Individual effects Pooled Random Fixed — — —
R2 0.212 0.212 0.158 0.057 0.042 0.114
N 849 849 849 552 552 239
42Table 8: The determinants of advisers’ return expectations with a separate gender effect
Investment advisers’ 20-year European and emerging market stock return expectations
regressed on sophistication composite index, log experience, log age, gender, and self-
perceived stock returns forecast ability. The sophistication index used in this table is created
without gender information. Gender dummy equals 1 if the subject is female, 0 if male.
Better (Worse) than average dummy variables equal 1 if the subject self-reports being better
(worse) than the average adviser in forecasting future returns. The t-statistics based on
heteroskedasticityrobuststandarderrorsareshowninparenthesis. Theitalicizedﬁguresinthe
gray columns depict percentages of adjusted R2 decompositions calculated using the Shapley
decomposition method of Shorrocks (1999). ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.
European Emerging market
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 9.9*** 4.2 15.4*** -6.5
(14.75) (1.03) (10.25) (-0.76)
Sophistication index (excl. gender) -1.0*** 66.9 -0.7*** 34.0 -2.4*** 76.1 -1.7*** 40.5
(-4.36) (-3.17) (-6.11) (-4.15)
log[experience (years) + 1] -0.1 0.7 -0.5 3.2 -0.4 -1.0 -1.3* 2.5
(-0.21) (-1.16) (-0.55) (-1.69)
log[age (years)] 1.6 7.3 6.0** 17.7
(1.32) (2.43)
Gender, female 1.6*** 28.8 2.6*** 20.9
(3.91) (3.11)
Better than average forecaster 0.4 -2.1 0.6 -1.2
(0.72) (0.62)
Worse than average forecaster -1.8** 4.5 -0.9 -0.9
(-2.56) (-0.41)
Employer ﬁxed-effects Yes 32.4 Yes 24.4 Yes 24.9 Yes 20.6
Adjusted R2 0.059 100 0.083 100 0.087 100 0.117 100
N 435 434 416 415
43Figure 1: Information sources for return expectations
The frequency of mentioning a source as a key information source for basing stock return
expectations.
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44Figure 2: Distribution of the expected returns
Figure a) shows the kernel density estimate of 20-year European return distributions
(Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = 0.7%), and ﬁgure b) shows the density estimate for 20-
year emerging market return distributions (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = 1.0%). The
model residual curves display the distribution of linear model residuals centered at the mean
of the raw returns. This linear model controls for a rich set of covariates, including employer
ﬁxed effects. The raw return distribution using the sample included in the regression model
is shown in gray for comparison. The employer information subsample curves display the
distribution of the same linear model residuals for a subsample where all respondents report
employer information as a primary source for basing return expectations.
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45Figure 3: Expected returns by sophistication quintiles
Average expected European and emerging market 20-year returns by sophistication quintiles.
The quintiles are formed using a composite sophistication index derived from factor analysis
using test score, second level examination, gender, and college dummy. The triangles
connected by dashed lines show the emerging market expected returns by sophistication
quintiles. The crosses connected by solid lines show the European market expected returns.
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46Figure 4: Gender effect on expected returns by sophistication terciles
The levels of the estimated gender effects (coefﬁcient for a dummy taking the value of one for
women, zero for men) from regression models corresponding to those reported as model (2)
in Table 8. Grey bar color denotes statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient at the 5% level. White bar
denotes statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients. The terciles are formed using a version of the
composite sophistication index that excludes gender.
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